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Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis (DART)
Real-Time Tsunami Reporting from the Deep Ocean
Hugh B. Milburn, Alex I. Nakamura, Frank I. Gonzalez
NOAA, Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory
7600 Sand Point Way NE
Seattle, WA 98115
Abstract - A 100-year historical database indicates that an average of five tsunamis per year
occur in the Pacific and that during this period tsunamis have killed more than 50,000 people [1].
At present, U.S. coastal communities receive warnings based on shore-based seismic data and
information from coastal sea level stations. An unacceptable 75% false alarm rate has prevailed.
Direct measurement of tsunamis in the open ocean, followed by real-time reports to warning
centers, could improve the assessment of the tsunami hazard. Tsunamis have been observed in
the deep ocean as part of a research program; furthermore, a recent successful demonstration of a
near real-time system has been completed. A surface mooring was deployed with an acoustic
modem and a bottom pressure recorder in 2600 m of water. Pressure data was remotely collected
from the seafloor via the acoustic modem and telemetered to shore via satellite. The deployment
of an array of these moorings in the Pacific is under consideration.
I. Introduction
National awareness of the tsunami hazard has been heightened by eight tsunamis generated
around the Pacific Rim in the last 4 years. The first occurred on 25 April 1992 off Cape
Mendocino, California [2]. Although small, this tsunami was significant because it was generated
by an earthquake at the southern end of the Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ), a region just
offshore of the U.S. west coast, which many geophysicists believe capable of much larger
earthquakes accompanied by large and destructive tsunamis [3]. The second was the tragically
destructive tsunami that attacked the Nicaraguan coast on 1 September 1992, leaving more than
100 people dead and thousands homeless [4]. The third was generated on 12 December 1992 by a
large earthquake off the north central coast of Flores Island, Indonesia, where more than 500
fatalities were attributed to the tsunami [5]. On 12 July 1993, the fourth devastating tsunami
struck the central west coast of Hokkaido, Japan, and the small offshore island of Okushiri. Over
200 fatalities were confirmed, and property losses were estimated at US$1.5 billion [6].
Indonesia was struck a second time by a devastating tsunami on 3 June 1994 that attacked the
south coasts of Java and Bali Islands, killing at least 300 people and destroying hundreds of
homes [7]. On 4 October 1994, a magnitude 8.1 Mw earthquake off the Kuril Islands generated a
large tsunami that caused considerable damage on Shikotan and Hokkaido islands [8]. Most
recently, two destructive tsunamis occurred within 4 days of each other, on 17 February 1996,
more than a hundred people were killed when a large tsunami attacked coastal communities on
Irian Jaya, Indonesia, and on 21 February 1996 tsunami waves killed 12 people on the
Peruvian coast.
U.S. congressional and public awareness of the tsunami hazard has also dramatically increased as
a result of widely publicized research on hazards associated with the CSZ, as well as the recent
Pacific rim tsunamis, reminders of the potentially disastrous effects of this phenomenon. The
expectation is that similarly destructive tsunamis will be generated by future large earthquakes in
both the CSZ and the Alaska-Aleutian Subduction Zone (AASZ). Only the exact time of these
events is uncertain.
For any tsunami, two scenarios must be considered, characterized by the distance between the
earthquake epicenter and the affected coastal community. This distance determines two critical
factors that govern hazard mitigation strategy: the magnitude of the resulting disaster, and the
time available to issue a warning. Communities at large epicentral distances (1000 km or more)
experience far-field (or distant) tsunamis, which can cause significant damage and fatalities, but
do not attack the coastline for hours. Communities at small epicentral distances (within 100 km
or so) experience near-field (or local) tsunamis that commonly inflict greater damage and more
fatalities within minutes of the earthquake main shock.
The distant tsunami problem has received the most attention to date, in terms of hazard
mitigation efforts. These remain a serious U.S. problem, especially in the case of Hawaii, which
is situated in a vulnerable position near the center of the Pacific basin. An important issue is false
alarms. The Pacific Tsunami Warning System was established in 1948, and issues warnings on
the basis of seismic data and sea level measurements from coastal tide stations. But such data do
not provide direct verification that a destructive tsunami is propagating across the Pacific toward
distant coastal communities. However, tsunami forecasters must err on the safe side, and
understandably so. As a consequence, 15 of 20 warnings issued have been considered false
alarms [9]. Unfortunately, such incidents not only undermine the credibility of the system, but are
surprisingly expensive as well, and substantial economic benefits would result if they were
reduced. In 1986, for example, the unnecessary tsunami evacuation of Honolulu shut down the
entire island of Oahu. Such disruptions can cost millions of dollars to the local economy in terms
of lost salaries, business revenue, and decreased productivity. Most recently, a very disruptive
false alarm was issued for the tsunami generated on 4 October 1994 near Shikotan Island in the
Kurils, north of Japan. Although destructive in the Kurils and northern Japan, the tsunami was
quite small on the U.S. west coast, where evacuations of a number of communities were carried
out [10]. The fear and disruption of a false alarm can itself put a population at physical risk;
fatalities and injuries have occurred during such evacuations.
II. Instrumentation
A. Bottom Pressure Recorder
PMEL has developed a deep-ocean tsunami observation capability based on long-term (>1 year)
deployments of bottom pressure recorders (BPRs) capable of accurately measuring tsunamis with
amplitudes as small as 0.5 cm in water depth up to 6 km [11]. The sensor in the BPR is a
Paroscientific, Inc. model 410K 0-10,000 psia piezoelectric Bourdon tube gauge that shows very
stable characteristics and low noise. The signal from the sensor is a square wave with a frequency
around 36 kHz with a range of 3 kHz full scale. This frequency variable signal is mixed with a
local oscillator and heterodyned into the range of 1 to 2 kHz. A hybrid period counting scheme
samples the sensor frequency every 15 seconds. One 16-bit counter is used to count whole cycles
in the 15-second sample window, and another 16-bit counter measures the time of the remaining
fractional cycle from the trailing edge of the sample window. This scheme yields a least-bit
resolution of 0.00035 psi, or approximately 0.25 mm of water. Pressure, temperature, and
engineering data are stored on a hard disk drive. Alkaline batteries power the system for
12-month deployments.
An array of 4 BPRs has been maintained in the north Pacific [12] since 1986. Data is shown in
Fig. 1 from one unit located approximately 1000 km from the epicenter of a 1988 earthquake in
the AASZ. Two types of waves were generated: seismic surface waves that induced vertical
motion of the sea floor, and tsunami waves that caused displacement of the sea surface. Both
waves were recorded by the BPR, each represented as one of the two distinct packets of energy
shown in the record. The first packet is composed of the seismic waves that traveled at 11,000
km/hr to arrive at the gauge only minutes after the event. The second packet shows the tsunami
waves that traveled at 800 km/hr to arrive 70 min after the earthquake. The recorded amplitudes
of the seismic surface wave are greatly exaggerated by acceleration forces [13] but this record
clearly demonstrates the ability of the BPR to measure these first arriving waves and the
following tsunami.
Fig. 1. BPR data from 6 March 1988 Gulf of Alaska showing waves from Ms=7.6 earthquake.
B. Prototype Real-Time System
Deep ocean tsunamis can be detected by bottom moored pressure gauges, and the challenge of
bringing that data ahore in a timely manner has now been addressed. A near real-time prototype
tsunami reporting system has been designed using a surface buoy moored over a BPR as a relay
point for tsunami data. It is not practical for technical reasons to make an electrical connection
from the sea floor to the surface to transmit data. Using low-power digital signal processing
capabilities, acoustic modems have been developed that are similar to the familiar
telephone-based computer modem. We used the commercially available Datasonics
ATM-845/851 modem pair in this experiment. They use a 1200-baud MFSK telemetry on the
uplink and an 80-baud FSK telemetry on the downlink. With frequencies in the 16 to 18 kHz
range and acoustic source levels of >190 db re 1 pa an effective range of 5 km or more is
possible.
A BPR was modified to work with an ATM-845 bottom modem with communications through a
serial RS232 standard. A 68HC11-based microcontroller was connected to the ATM-851 surface
modem via a serial port and to an Argos satellite uplink transmitter. Both the top and bottom
units were powered by alkaline batteries so power consumption was carefully controlled.
Considerable effort was expended on establishing a robust protocol for the remote acoustic
telemetry between the surface and the bottom. The messages passed between the surface and
subsurface unit are of fixed format containing a message integrity element. They contain a fixed
4-character header, the CRC (cyclic redundancy check) of the message block, a character count
of the message block, the message type, and the message. The message can be a command or
data. each message must be acknowledged either by an ASCII ACK or NAK character. The
ACK character indicates that the receiver received the message intact, and the NAK indicates
that the message was corrupted. If the sender receives a NAK or nothing in a fixed interval, it
will resend the message. The sender will give up after 3 tries. The 4-character header provides a
reference point in the message for the message interpreter. If at least one of the header characters
is not corrupted, the interpreter will be able to decipher the message, provided that the CRC of
the message is valid.
This demonstration experiment had the surface unit command the BPR to transmit data at set
intervals. This was considered the most demanding test possible of the modem capabilities, as
the uplink is more robust than the downlink. If the future brings a two-way satellite link from
shore to the buoy it will be desirable to command the system to send data, which will necessitate
a downlink capability. Data from this prototype system was transmitted via the polar orbiting
NOAA TIROS satellite with an Argos Platform Transmit Terminal. Data was packed into 4
blocks of 32 bytes each and transmitted on a 90-second round robin schedule in a 4-hour window
when a satellite was in view. This method is not acceptable for a real-time reporting system due
to the inherent delay, but served as an expedient test platform. An operational mooring would
send data via the NOAA GOES geostationary satellite or through one of the commercial low
earth orbit satellites soon to be available.
The mooring used in this experiment is a proven design that is reliable and inexpensive. The
buoy is a simple fiberglass and foam structure with a taut moor of wire rope and nylon line to a
clump anchor (Fig. 2). The acoustic transducer for the surface unit was mounted on the side of
the buoy bridle at a depth of 1.2 m. It was surrounded on the sides and the top by a 0.4 m
diameter by 0.2 m high cylindrical foam baffle in an attempt to minimize the effect of surface
noise on the transducer.
Fig. 2. Prototype real-time tsunami reporting system.
C. Results of Field Experiment
The prototype mooring was deployed at 46 28 N, 129 30 W in 2611 m of water on 23 May and
recovered on 19 July 1995. The BPR was moored approximately 250 m from the anchor of the
surface mooring. The BPR, acoustic modems, software protocols, and satellite data telemetry
performed as expected throughout the 57-day period. Pressure data transmitted in engineering
units were received daily and showed the dominant tidal cycles and the characteristic low drift of
the Paros sensor.
The mooring was located within 70 km of a NOAA NDBC buoy, which reported winds and
wave data. Although summer weather prevailed in the latter half of the deployment, significant
wave heights exceeded 6 m on 11 June and winds of 10 m/sec or greater were common in June.
There was no loss of data correlated with periods of high wind and waves. This indicated that
surface wave noise and wave-driven buoy motion was not a factor in the acoustic modem
performance. However, approximately 5% of the data were lost in the transmission cycle. On
three occasions, engineering records indicate that the subsurface unit did not respond to
commands from the surface unit. On nearly all other occasions the subsurface unit responded on
the first request and the uplink worked without fail. The 60 beam pattern of the transducers,
unknown BPR platform attitude, and the 1.4 km buoy watch circle may have contributed to the
lost transmissions.
Fig. 3. BPR data transmitted from the seafloor in near real time. Lower panel shows data from a
nearby NDBC buoy.
Although very successful, this experiment showed the necessity of quantifying the operating
parameters of the modems and increasing the engineering data stored and transmitted. Wider
beam transducers, possibly with higher power, will be evaluated. Gimbaling the subsurface
transducer mounts or additional baffling of the surface transducer may improve the
signal-to-noise ratio. Also, engineering efforts will be directed at refining modem protocols and
evaluating satellite telemetry options. To complement any two-way telemetry scheme, algorithms
will be developed for the BPR firmware that will detect a passing tsunami and initiate data
transmission from the bottom unit. This scheme will be inherently more robust and, with hourly
reporting of operational status, reliability of the mooring system could be assured.
III. Proposed Pacific Array
NOAA is proposing the establishment of a real-time reporting network of deep ocean tsunami
detection buoys [14]. The rationale for this is straightforward. Coastal communities in Alaska,
Hawaii, and on the U.S. west coast are threatened by tsunamis generated in the AASZ, the CSZ,
and seismically active regions off South America and Kamchatka.
Detection systems strategically located seaward of known tsunami source regions will provide
the needed verification within minutes of an earthquake through direct measurements. If no
tsunami is detected, a false alarm will be averted. Conversely, if a tsunami is detected, the
detection system will provide warning centers with the single most important piece of
information required for decision-making: the deep ocean tsunami amplitude. Consequently, this
system will not only decrease false alarms, but will also improve the speed and accuracy of true
alarms.
The initial 6-element array proposed [14] is designed to protect the U.S. coastline by early
detection of tsunamis generated in the AASZ (2 systems), the CSZ (2), and off the coasts of
Kamchatka (1) and South America (1). These systems would also benefit other Pacific Rim
countries, providing, for example, early detection for Japan of tsunamis generated off the South
American coast. We believe that the successful deployment and maintenance of the initial
network off eastern and northern Pacific seismic regions will spur an international effort to
develop a similar network in the western Pacific.
IV. Summary/Acknowledgments
A prototype system for reporting tsunami data from the deep ocean has been demonstrated.
Additional effort will be required to bring an operational system on line, but when fully
developed and deployed, these moorings will aid significantly in tsunami hazard mitigation.
We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of C. Meinig for field operations, H. Mofjeld for tidal
analysis, and J. Newman for data processing. This work was funded by NOAA/ERL. PMEL
Contribution 1757.
References
[1] Lockridge, P.A., "Historical tsunamis in the Pacific basin," in Proc. Inter. Symp. Natural and
Man-Made Hazards, M.I. El-Sabh and T.S. Murty, Eds., pp. 171-181, 1988.
[2] Gonzalez, F.I. and E.N. Bernard, "The Cape Mendocino Tsunami," Earthquakes and
Volcanoes, vol. 23, pp. 135-138, 1992.
[3] Weaver, C.S., and K.M. Shedlock, "Estimates of seismic source regions from consideration
of the earthquake distribution and regional tectonics in the Pacific Northwest," U.S. Geological
Survey Open-File Report 91-441, 51 pp., 1992.
[4] Satake, K., Bourgeois, Ku. Abe, Ka. Abe, Y. Tsuji, F. Imamura, Y. Ito, H. Katao, E. Noguera
and F. Estrada, "Tsunami field survey of the 1992 Nicaragua earthquake," Eos, Trans. AGU, Vol.
74, pp. 156-157, 1993.
[5] Tsuji, Y., H. Matsutomi, F. Imamura, M. Takeo, Y. Kawata, M. Matsuyama, T. Takahashi,
Sonarjo and P. Harjadi, "Damage to coastal villages due to the 1992 Flores Island earthquake
tsunami," in Tsunamis: 1992-1994, Their Generation, Dynamics and Hazard, K. Satake and F.
Imamura, Eds., Birkhauser Verlag, pp. 481-524, 1995.
[6] Bernard, E.N. and F.I. Gonzalez (Hokkaido Tsunami Survey Group), "Tsunami devastates
Japanese coastal region," Eos Trans. AGU, Vol. 74, No. 37, pp. 417, 432, 1993.
[7] Tsuji, Y., F. Imamura, H. Matsutomi, C.E. Synolakis, P.T. Nanang, Jamadi, S. Harada, S.S.
Han, K. Arai and B. Cook, "Field survey of the East Java earthquake and tsunami of June 3,
1994," In: Tsunamis: 1992-1994, Their Generation, Dynamics and Hazard, K. Satake and F.
Imamura, Eds., Birkhauser Verlag, pp. 839-854, 1995.
[8] Yeh, H., V. Titov, V. Gusiakov, E. Pelinovsky, V. Khramushin and V. Kaistrenko, "The 1994
Shikotan earthquake tsunamis, In: Tsunamis: 1992-1994, Their Generation, Dynamics and
Hazard, K. Satake and F. Imamura, Eds., Birkhauser Verlag, pp. 855-874, 1995.
[9] Yanagi, B.S., "Tsunami Preparedness in Hawaii," in Coastal Earthquakes and Tsunamis:
Reducing the Risks, J.W. Charland and J.W. Good, Eds., Corvallis, OR, Oregon Sea Grant,
1996.
[10] Good, J.W., "Tsunami Education Planning Workshop Findings and Recommendations,"
Appendix E, NOAA Technical Memorandum ERL PMEL-106, 41 pp., 1995.
[11] M.C. Eble and F.I. Gonzalez, "Deep-ocean bottom pressure measurements in the northeast
Pacific," J. Atmos. Oceanic Tech., Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 221-233, 1991.
[12] Gonzalez, F.I., E.N. Bernard, H.B. Milburn, D. Castel, J. Thomas, and J.M. Hemsley, "The
Pacific tsunami observation program (PacTOP)," Proc. 1987 Inter. Tsunami Symp., IUGG, pp.
3-19, 1987.
[13] J.H. Filloux, "Tsunami recorded on the open ocean floor," Geophys. Res. Lett., Vol. 9,
25-28, 1982.
[14] E.N. Bernard, "Reducing tsunami hazards along U.S. coastlines," in Perspectives on
Tsunami Hazard Reduction, Proceedings of the 1995 IUGG Tsunami Symposium, Kluwer
Academic Publishers, (in press), 1996.
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